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Abstract--Linear multisectoral models have been applied to development planning in 
countries with different socioeconomic systems. The relative simplicity of the underlying 
technique has concealed much of the conceptual differences between modelling in East 
and West. However, the recent development of more sophisticated models, under the 
general title of computable general equilibrium odels, has apparently enhanced these 
differences, and concealed the possibility that these models could also be used in both 
East and West. This paper investigates i sues related to the possible adaptation of 
equilibrium odelling techniques for central planning purposes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Linear multisectoral input-output and programming models have become more or less 
integrated into the complex process of planning in many socialist (centrally planned) 
economies. These models concentrate on the production and use of economic resources 
and commodities at some level of aggregation. Similar models are also used in both 
western and developing countries, the differences in the economic environment and data 
sources being reflected in the specification and purpose of the models. The use of linear 
models has been paralleled by the development of more complex, nonlinear models, 
most of which come under the general heading of computable or applied general 
equilibrium models. 
The basic ideas of a multisectoral general equilibrium growth model were first 
suggested by Johansen [2] in 1959, although full-scale implementation f large, nonlinear 
models has become computationally feasible only lately. Recent applications are des- 
cribed in Refs. 3-7; models of this type developed at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) are discussed in Refs. 8-11 (retrospective analysis) 
and Refs. 12 and 13 (projections for small open economies). Some of these models have 
been designed to capture the interrelationships between economic, spatial, and demo- 
graphic processes (for a critical review of these models see Ref. 14). 
The structure of general equilibrium models, the estimation procedures applied, and 
the theoretical explanations associated with them generally follow the neoclassical 
tradition quite closely. The neoclassical approach as often been criticized and even 
rejected in both East and West (see, for example, Ref. 15), and this partly explains 
the apparent lack of interest of central planning modellers in these models. It is not at all 
This paper is based on an IIASA Working Paper [1] which contains a more detailed discussion of most of 
the issues only touched upon here. The Working Paper also describes a complex equilibrium model currently 
being implemented in Hungary. 
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obvious whether the models, or some of the techniques of applied general equilibrium 
modelling, could be adapted for central planning processes. 
The main purpose of this paper is to highlight he possibility and expected benefits of 
incorporating nonlinear multisectoral models of the general equilibrium type into the 
planning methodology of socialist (centrally planned) economies. This is done by means 
of a comparative modelling exercise, which is essentially a reformulation of the old idea 
that there is a fundamental equivalence between equilibrium solutions obtained through 
a competitive mechanism and the optimal solutions of a centrally planned resource 
allocation problem. This idea has been formulated in many ways (e.g., in terms of 
welfare economics or as a simple linear programming model). Here it will be put into a 
specific economic ontext and used to gain more insight into the central problem studied 
in this paper: why and how the analytical techniques used in multisectoral general 
equilibrium models could be fitted into the current planning modelling methodology of
centrally planned economies. 
Although this paper is mainly addressed to planning modellers in socialist countries 
who are not very familiar with general equilibrium modelling, it is hoped that some of 
the conclusions of this comparative xercise will also be of some value to economic 
modellers elsewhere. 
Two simple models of the same resource allocation problem will be developed as a 
basis for discussion and comparison: first, a stylized competitive equilibrium odel (Sec. 
1); second, an equally stylized programming model of the type used in central planning 
(Sec. 2). Some crucial conceptual differences between the models are discussed briefly in 
Sec. 3, where it will also be shown that the planning model can be reformulated as a 
general equilibrium model without losing any of its fundamental characteristics. Finally, 
the possible advantages of such a transformation are considered in Sec. 4. 
1. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM 
General competitive quilibrium theory a provides an abstract partial model of the 
economic systems centered around the law of supply and demand, and rational 
economic behavior. The abstract economic theory of general equilibrium takes many 
important elements of the economy as data and sets out to define and determine the 
equilibrium within this postulated environment in which only prices control economic 
decisions. This theory has more empirical relevance when explaining relative changes 
than when dealing with absolute magnitudes. 
Applied general equilibrium models adopt a relative point of view and try to estimate 
the likely consequences of various changes in the economic environment by comparing 
the "base equilibrium solution" with the solutions computed on the basis of these 
changes. A typical approach may be summarized as follows. A formal model of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for general equilibrium is developed. The observed 
state of the economy is considered to be in equilibrium (base solution), and many of the 
parameters of the model are estimated on the basis of this assumption. Next, by 
classifying the economic variables as endogenous or exogenous, the impact of assumed 
changes in the exogenous variables is analyzed in terms of the model solution. Thus, the 
equilibrium framework is used to evaluate, consistently and in quantitative t rms, the 
direction of change of certain crucial interdependent economic variables. 
The underlying logic of multisectoral general equilibrium models and their relation to 
some structurally similar optimal planning models may be understood more readily if the 
a We will confine our attention tocompetitive or Walrasian general equilibrium odels in this paper. 
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resource allocation problem is stripped to its bare essentials. The model presented below 
is a simplified, static model of competitive quilibrium, which perhaps resembles most 
closely the models of the Scandinavian school. 
First we define the variables and parameters that are considered in the model. 
Var iab les :  
X~+I 
kj,  
hi, N/ 
c, 
P, 
Pn+l 
p'¢ 
W 
Wj 
R 
Rj  
Q 
E 
H i  
gross output in sector j = 1, 2 . . .  n ;b 
total gross investment; 
capital input coefficient and total capital used in sector j = 1, 2 . . .  n ; 
labor input coefficient and total employment in sector j -- 1, 2 . . .  n ; 
consumption of commodity i = l, 2 . . .  n; 
price of commodity i -- 1, 2 . . .  n; 
price of the composite capital good; 
"net price" (value added per unit) of commodity i = l, 2 . . .  n ; 
general index of the level of wages; 
level of wages in sector j = l, 2 . . .  n ; 
general index of net return on capital; 
rate of return on capital in sector j -- l, 2 . . .  n; 
user cost of capital in sector j -- 1, 2 . . .  n ; 
consumption expenditures; 
net income (profit) in sector j = 1, 2 . . .  n. 
Parameters  (exogenous  var iab les ) :  
N total labor force; 
K total capital stock; 
I total net investment; 
aij input of commodity i = 1, 2 . . .  n per unit of output in sector j = 1, 2 . . .  n; 
ai.,÷~ input of commodity i = 1, 2 . . .  n per unit of gross investment; 
~i annual rate of depreciation i  sector j = 1, 2 . . .  n; 
toj index of the relative wage rate in sector j = 1, 2 . . .  n ; 
/3j index of the relative rate of return on capital in sector j = 1, 2 . . .  n; 
b~, c~ parameters in the consumer's demand function for commodity i = 1, 2 . . .  n. 
We can now summarize the basic features of a general equilibrium model. 
There are n produced commodities in the model available for both intermediate and 
final use, one composite new capital (investment) good, and two primary commodities 
(capital and labor). 
The production technology for the sectoral commodities is given by a combined 
Leontief-neoclassical formulation. The use of intermediate inputs is assumed to be 
proportional to the. output level of the produced commodity, i.e., 
a l jX  i i = l ,  2 . . . n ; j = l ,  2 . . . n 
whereas in the case of primary inputs we allow for the possibility of substitution. The 
Leontief character of the production technology is maintained, however, by assuming 
this substitutability to be independent of the level of output. Namely, once the capi- 
tal/labor ratio is determined, the required amount of the two factors is proportional to 
the level of output. Thus, the relation between the output and the primary inputs can be 
b In the model, each sector produces only one kind of commodity and each commodity isproduced by only 
one sector. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sectors and the commodities produced. 
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described by a linear homogeneous (production) functionC: 
Xj = Fj(Nj,  K~) j = 1, 2 . . .  n. 
The production of the composite investment good is assumed to require only 
intermediate commodities in amounts proportional to the level of gross investment 
(capital formation): 
ai.,,+lXn+l i = 1, 2 . . .  n. 
The technology defined above exhibits constant returns to scale; therefore, in com- 
petitive equilibrium, the nonprofit condition must hold for each producing sector, as will 
be shown below. 
In the spirit of the neoclassical tradition, producers are assumed to maximize their 
net income, the difference between the value of the commodities bought (rented) and 
sold. In the case of the investment good sector this simply means that, at equilibrium, 
prices have to satisfy the following condition: 
n 
P,+t=__~lPiai.,+t. (1) 
We will define the net income function (IIj) for the first n sectors and derive 
analytically the necessary conditions for a maximum amount of net income. 
The cost of labor in sector j is simply Wj = tojW. The user's cost of capital is defined 
as the sum of depreciation and net return requirement (renO. At the same time, capital 
stock is assumed to be reevaluated at current prices, given by Pn+~. Therefore, the cost 
of using capital (evaluated at some base price) in sector j is given by 
Qj = (sj + Rj)P~+, = (sj +/3.~)P.+,. (2) 
For future reference it is worth noting here that the introduction of different rate-of- 
return requirements on capital in different sectors can be interpreted, for instance, as a 
reflection of lasting market imperfections. It will be shown that this solution has effects 
similar to individual bounds on sectoral capital inputs, which, in turn, can be interpreted 
as limited intersectoral mobility of capital. 
The net income earned by producing X~ is thus defined by the following expression: 
n 
IIj = PjX~ - ~ P, ar~Xj - WjNj - QjKj (2a) 
which is to be maximized subject o the constraint 
xj  -- Fj(Nj, K~). 
Substituting Fi(Nj, Kj) for Xj in Eq. (2a) and differentiating the net income function with 
respect o Nj and Kj yields the following necessary first-order conditions for an optimal 
c The term "production function" is not quite appropriate here since we use it only to define a composite 
primary factor. The function is assumed to be "well behaved" (i.e., concave, monotone increasing, and 
differentiable). 
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solution: 
aNj = = (3) 
P*aK j  QJ' 
where P~ is the value added per unit of output j:d 
(4) 
n 
P * = Pj - ~ Pia O. (5) 
It can easily be seen that if we multiply Eqs. (3) and (4) by N s and K i, respectively, and 
add them together, then, because of the assumed linear homogeneity of the production 
functions, we will have 
wj Oj = Wjnj + QA. 
x j  
(sa) 
This shows that the net income will be zero at equilibrium (the nonprofit or, more 
accurately, "no extra profit" condition). 
It is worth mentioning here that if we insert Eq. (5a) into Eq. (5), after rearrangement 
we obtain 
n 
Pj = ~ Piaij + Wjnj + Qjkj. (Sb) 
The resulting price formation rule is very similar to that used to determine the so-called 
"two-channel price system" employed in socialist price planning theory and practice. 
Here, however, n i and k i as well as Wj and Qi are endogenous to the equilibrium model. 
The next behavioral assumption concerns the consumers. The consumers' demand for 
goods and services is represented by a set of demand functions: 
Ci = Ci(Pt, P2- • • P,, E) i = 1, 2 . . ,  n, 
where E is the total consumption expenditure, an endogenous variable, e As in most 
applied models, we will adopt a Linear Expenditure System (LES): 
Ci=b i+&(  -~" Pjbi) i = 1, 2 . . .  n, (6) 
where bi is often interpreted as the minimum (subsistence) consumption of commodity i,
which must be dealt with first. The remaining income is then allocated between the 
various commodities according to their relative prices and to the marginal propensities to 
o Notice that if instead of substituting Fj for Xj in the net income function we utilized aLagrange multiplier, 
then P~ could be taken as the value of this multiplier. 
C The analysis of the programming model will shed some light on the endogenous determination f 
consumption expenditure in the equilibrium odel. 
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t l  
c~ >0and ~ ci = 1. 
i= l  
In this simplified model, the state of the economy can be described fully by the values 
of the endogenous variables: Pj, P,+I, Qj, R, W, P*, E, Xi, Ci, Kj, Nj. Of these, variables 
X~, C~, K i, and Nj (the real variables) describe the production and use of different 
commodities. Whether the economy considered is centrally planned or market based (or 
a mixture of the two), the above variables must fulfill certain "physical" conditions. 
These conditions include commodity and resource balances (market clearing constraints) 
and technological restrictions. The balance and capacity constraints are generally given 
in the form of inequalities. However, it is well known that if the equilibrium price of a 
commodity is positive, then the corresponding balance inequality must be fulfilled as an 
equality. The special assumptions of our model guarantee that the equilibrium price of each 
commodity and resource will be positive, and therefore we may use equalities traight 
away: 
a+l  
3~ aoXj + Ci = X~ i = 1, 2 . . .  n (7) 
= 
t l  
~ SjKj + I = X,+~ (8) 
= 
n 
~ Kj = K (9) 
= 
n 
= Nj = N (10) 
Fj(Nj, Kj) = Xi j = 1, 2 . . .  n. ( l l )  
Equations (7)-(11), together with behavioral and pricing equations (1)-(6), define a 
simultaneous system of equations that must be fulfilled by equilibrium solutions. It can 
easily be checked that all of these equations are homogeneous in all prices (both gross 
and net), wage rate (W), and total consumption expenditure (E). Therefore, the general 
level of these variables is indeterminate, and can be chosen arbitrarily. This can also be 
checked by comparing the numbers of equations and variables (7n + 4 equations, 7n + 5 
variables). 
2. AN OPTIMAL PLANNING MODEL VERSION 
OF THE PROBLEM 
Now we shall describe a planning model that could be used to determine the optimal 
allocation of resources in the same model economy. An economy-wide planning model, 
built into and upon the traditional planning methodology of a socialist country, would 
differ from the above general equilibrium model in several respects. First, it would 
almost exclusively contain "real" variables and relations reflecting physical constraints 
on allocation. Second, because the prices used in a planning model are either constant or 
planned, being predicted more or less independently from "real" processes, the inter- 
dependence of the real and value (prices, taxes, rate-of-return requirements, etc.) 
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variables would not be considered explicitly in the model. Third, most mathematical 
planning models are closely related to and rely upon traditional or nonmathematical 
planning. This means, among other things, that the values of the exogenous variables 
and parameters and also certain upper and/or lower target values for some of the 
endogenous variables would not be derived directly from statistical observations, but 
would be based on figures given by traditional planners, f (This is not to say, however, 
that more or less sophisticated statistical estimation techniques would not be combined 
with experts' "guesstimates" in traditional planning.) And, finally, planning modellers in 
socialist countries tend to concentrate more on the problems of how to fit their models 
into the actual process of planning and make them practically applicable and useful. 
Therefore, applied planning models tend to be both theoretically and methodologically 
simpler than those in the development planning literature. The above list is, of course, 
far from complete, but nevertheless includes most of the major characteristics of 
socialist planning models. 
We now proceed to describe a simplified model, which demonstrates how the 
resource allocation problem could be modelled in a centrally planned economy. 
Suppose that at some stage in the planning process the coordinating unit decides to 
summarize the calculations made so far, and as a result some provisional values of the 
sectoral outputs, inputs, consumption, etc., are therefore made available. The coordinat- 
ing unit wishes to know whether these more or less separately planned figures represent 
a consistent and balanced picture, and if not, how this could be rectified. The unit also 
wishes to check whether the efficiency of the provisional plan could be increased by 
reallocating resources among the various sectors. To get some rough answers to these 
questions, it is necessary to have some idea of how certain changes in one part of the 
plan would affect other parts of the plan, and what changes (plan variants) seem to be 
feasible. This information could then be put into a formal model to support he process 
of checking the consistency and efficiency of a draft plan (coordination process). 
We shall consider a rather simple model in which the plan variables are the output 
levels of various sectoral commodities (X~; j = 1, 2 . . .  n + 1), their levels of consumption 
(Ci; i = 1, 2 . . .  n), and the amounts of labor and capital (fixed assets) allocated for their 
production (Nj, Kj; j = 1, 2 . . .  n). s All feasible resource allocation programs must satisfy 
commodity (resource) balance requirements and technological constraints analogous to 
equalities (7)-(11), although in this case the constraints will be inequalities. 
Beyond that, as mentioned earlier, the planning model would reflect certain require- 
ments derived from traditional planning calculations. We will consider here only a few 
representative examples. For example, consumption of different commodities may be 
limited from below by their planned target levels. The model builders may also take into 
consideration certain limitations concerning the possible intersectoral location of given 
primary resources. In the case of capital, for example, the existing sectoral capacities 
may be taken as lower limits, while calculations concerning the capital absorptive 
capacities of the various sectors may indicate upper limits to the amount of capital that 
should be allocated to each sector. Lower and upper limits to the number of workers 
employed in different sectors can be established in a similar way. 
Suppose now that all options satisfying the above conditions are regarded as feasible 
plan variants (at least at the stage and level of planning considered). The efficiency of the 
t Th is  is especially true for the national programming models used in Hungary, where one of the basic aims 
of the modeUers i to check the feasibility and improve upon the efficiency of the plans developed by 
traditional p anners [16]. 
S For simplicity we use  the same symbols as before. Notice, however, that here may be important 
d i f fe rences  in their interpretation n the planning context. 
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different variants can be measured in a number of ways, and in practice various types 
of objective function are used to generate a whole range of efficient plan variants. For the 
sake of simplicity, however, we assume here that the efficiency of the plan variants is 
measured by a geometric weighted average of the surplus (incremental) consumption of 
the different commodities. Denoting the surplus consumption of commodity i by C~ and 
its weight by s~, where 
¢t 
~l  Si = 1, 
= 
we can then formulate the following objective function: 
+ 51 + $2 g(c*) = (c , )  ( c9  . . .  (c*~)',. 
Using the above specifications, the optimal plan is then determined as the solution of 
a nonlinear programming problem in which we maximize function g(C +) subject o the 
following constraints: 
n+l  
(Pi) ~= aiiXj + C ~, + C~ <= Xi i = 1, 2 . . .  n (7') 
n 
(P.+O ~= 8jKj + I =< X.+~ (8') 
tt 
(S) ~= Kj =< K (9') 
n 
(w) ~= Nj <_- N 00') 
(P*) 
(S.;, S,) 
(W;, W;) 
Xj -F i (N j ,  Kj)<=O j= l ,2 . . .n  
K;<__Kj< + =Kj  j=  1 ,2 . .n  
N;<-_Ni<<-N[ j= l ,2 . . .n  
xj, c;,Kj, rcj~-o, 
(11') 
where the meaning of the variables and parameters i  essentially the same as before. In 
addition, C7 is the lower bound on consumption of commodity i, while K~, K~ and N~, 
N~ represent, respectively, the lower ( - )  and upper (+) bounds of Kj and Nj. The 
symbols in parentheses denote the dual variables h associated with each constraint. 
Apart from structural and conceptual simplifications, this model differs from tradi- 
tional programming planning models in that it is not completely linear (the production 
functions and the objective function are both nonlinear). We will discuss the nonlinearity 
of the objective function later. 
Before going any further, however, we should comment on the use of smooth 
("neoclassical") macroproduction functions in our planning model. The use of functions 
of this type in centrally planned economies i  often criticized on both theoretical and 
h Some dual variables (shadow prices) are denoted by the same symbols as the equilibrium prices, for reasons 
that become obvious in the next section. See also the previous footnote. 
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empirical grounds. In addition to the known statistical estimation problems, the esti- 
mated parameters of macroproduction functions are often biased by neoclassical 
assumptions concerning income distribution. We believe, however, that it is possible to 
design estimation procedures that fit the needs and conditions of centrally planned 
economies. 
To illustrate the point above consider first of all that the production functions in our 
model serve only one purpose: to allow for alternative sectoral production technologies 
that may be more or less labor/capital-intensive than current echniques. Linear planning 
(programming) models usually allow for alternative technologies but in a different way. 
The range of technological choice in aggregated macromodels is rather limited, and for a 
realistic description of sectoral production possibilities in a linear model it is necessary 
to give up the "macro" character of the model, to break down each sector into 
subsectors, and to introduce individual bounds to limit their levels. This not only 
increases the size of the model significantly, thus making it less flexible and transparent, 
but also distorts the dual solution. It therefore seems reasonable to use smooth 
macroproduction functions to avoid such a situation. 
We suggest hat the parameters of macroproduction functions could be estimated 
using the following or a similar procedure, i First, a set of subsectoral ctivities is defined 
for a given sector. These may be the activities taken into consideration i a large 
disaggregate model. This information could then be used to generate a number of 
alternative intrasectoral production structures with different output and input levels. 
Finally, by an appropriate production function form, this information could be conden- 
sed into a few (three or less) parameters and this function used in the aggregated 
macromodel. This procedure, thus, can be viewed as a special way of decomposing the 
large-scale problem. Production functions defined on the basis of detailed subsectoral 
activities could be used in both macroprogramming and general equilibrium models. The 
technological information may be ex post or ex ante (planned) or some combination of 
the two. 
3. COMPARISON OF THE TWO APPROACHES 
We have presented two specific models: a general equilibrium model, intended for 
counter-factual simulations in a market economy, and a mathematical programming 
model, designed for counter-plan-proposal simulations in a centrally planned economy. 
The first was based on neoclassical ssumptions of competitive pricing and individual 
optimization behavior. Not only the structure of this model, but also the estimation of its 
parameters (e.g., those in the production and demand functions) should be consistent 
with the theoretical assumptions of a competitive market mechanism. The planning 
model contained no behavioral assumptions or pricing rules; its purpose was to check 
the overall consistency and efficiency of proposed resource allocations. The parameters 
of the model reflected planned technological conditions and targets (ex ante statistics). 
The general equilibrium model had the form of a system of equations (preferably with a 
unique solution), whereas the planning model had the form of a constrained optimum 
(alternative solutions preferred). We will now show that, in spite of these and other basic 
differences which appear in more complex models, the two models have a strong formal 
similarity. 
i Th i s  method bears an obvious resemblance to Johansen's treatment of sectoral production functions [17] 
and also to the way in which Rimmler, Daniel, and Kornai estimated macrofunctions on the basis of 
programming models [18]. 
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The close similarity of the two models discussed in this paper stems from two 
fundamental theorems. The formal (mathematical) basis is provided by the Kuhn- 
Tucker theorem on constrained optima. The conceptual (economic) foundation is given 
by the central proposition of welfare economics which relates Pareto-optimality 
(efficiency) to competitive equilibrium. 
These results are quite well-known--however, we would like to interpret them in a 
somewhat unusual way. Instead of regarding programming as a special type of com- 
petitive analysis, we want to argue that applied general equilibrium modelling is nothing 
but an alternative method for macroeconomic programming. Even if one faithfully 
believes in general competitive quilibrium theory the fact that only aggregated 
producers and consumers can be considered in a computable model implies some 
theoretical inconsistencies. The only possibility of interpreting such models therefore 
seems to lie with their programming counterparts. 
We shall now demonstrate he formal identity of the two kinds of model in the special 
case discussed above. In order to do this we will show how the programming model can 
be transformed into a system of equations formally identical to the general equilibrium 
model. 
For the purposes of our investigation, it is reasonable to assume that the programming 
problem has a solution and that the conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem on 
constrained optima are met by our model. Making the normal assumptions, the optimal 
values of the primal (real) variables in our model will be positive and the constraints 
(except for some individual bounds) will be fulfilled as equalities. According to the 
Kuhn-Tucker theorem, differentiating the associated Lagrange function with respect o 
the primal variables will yield a set of constraints that must be fulfilled by the dual 
variables (shadow prices) associated with the various constraints of the primal problem. 
In our case the Lagrange function takes the following form: 
n 
n 
n /1 
/1 n 
- N s;(K,- N s ; (K; -  K,) 
/1 N 
- E__, w;(s, - w; (N; -  s,) 
n 
- ~= P~,(xj  - Fj(Nj, Kj)). 
Differentiating it then yields the following set of equations: 
0L /1 
(1') 
n 
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(_f~j ) o Fj = 
3L P*ONj W+WT-W;  j=l,2...n (13) 
(-d-Kj) o6 = p,+,~ + s + ST-- S; j = 1, 2 . . .  n (14) OL P* OKj 
where the differentials in parentheses before each equation indicate how the equation 
was derived. 
Since the physical constraints of the two models are formally identical (except for the 
individual bounds on the sectoral use of primary resources), we only have to show that 
we can reproduce shadow pricing and behavioral equations imilar to Eqs. (1)-(5) in the 
equilibrium model. Note, first, that Eqs. (1) and (5) of the equilibrium model appear in an 
identical form in the dual of the optimal planning model, as Eqs. (l') and (5'). Equations 
(3) and (4), which represent the necessary conditions for profit maximization i  the 
equilibrium model, have Eqs. (13) and (14) as their planning counterparts. At first glance 
they seem to be quite different, but closer examination reveals some essential similari- 
ties. 
Consider Eqs. (3) and (13) first. Their left-hand sides are identical, but on their 
right-hand sides we find tojW and W + W T - W i, respectively. In the literature concern- 
ing the design of (linear) programming models for development planning, the use of 
individual bounds (like N~, N;) is often criticized because they "pick up shadow prices 
which have no clear meaning and which, since all dual prices are interdependent, distort 
the dual solution" [19]. In our case, however, the shadow prices of the individual bounds 
are easy to interpret in the light of the equilibrium model. Variable W can be interpreted 
as the general shadow wage rate (i.e., the optimal rate of return on labor). Next, we can 
define 
,,,,+ w;-  w; (, + w; ww;) 
t°i= W = j= l ,2 . . .n ,  
where the derived variable co; may be interpreted as an endogenously determined index 
of the relative shadow wage rate in sector j. 
Similarly, we may interpret the dual variable S in Eq. (14) as the optimal (shadow) net 
rate of return on capital (evaluated at base price). Thus, we can calculate R = S/P,+~ so 
as to obtain the same rate of return at current (shadow) prices, and 
,8}=S+S;--S S~-=(I+S;-sSJ-) j= l ,2 . . .n  
can be interpreted as an index of the relative rate-of-return requirement on capital in 
sector j. In this way we can rewrite the right-hand side of Eq. (14) as 
(Sj + ,8;R)P,+I = Q;, 
which is equivalent to the right-hand side of Eq. (4). 
The "shadow cost" of capital differs from its equilibrium counterpart only in that the 
relative net rate of return is determined endogenously, not given exogenously. We will 
return to this difference later. 
The only thing we have not yet demonstrated is that the solution of the optimal 
planning problem can be used to derive a set of special LES "demand" equations; this 
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may be shown as follows. Observe that the partial derivative of the objective function is 
(sJC+)g(C+). Thus, Eq. (12) can be rewritten as 
si P~ =~g(C +) i = 1, 2 . . .  n. (14a) 
Multiplying Eq. (14a) by the appropriate C~ and adding together the equations for all i 
yields 
n 
P,C + = g(C+). (14b) 
i=  l=  
Next, we can calculate the shadow value of total consumption j as 
n n 
EP iC ;  + ~_, P,C; = E. (14c) 
/=1= j=|= 
From Eqs. (14b) and (14c) we get 
n 
Finally, substituting the above expression for g(C +) in (14a) and solving the equation for 
C + yields 
C+=~ E-  PiC; i=  1 ,2 . . .n .  
= 
Thus, the total consumption of commodity i is 
n 
i.e., the demand function implied by the specifications of the optimal planning model, k
However, the parameters are evaluated on the basis of information provided by 
traditional planning calculations, and they therefore reflect he planners' preferences and 
commitments. 
It is interesting to note here that if we had a linear objective function, for example if 
instead of maximizing the weighted geometric average we maximized, as is often the 
case, the level of surplus consumption (y) in a fixed structure (C~ = ycD, then the 
implied demand function would be 
n 
Pjc; = 
i Incidentally, this indicates how the level of total expenditure is determined endogenously in the general 
equilibrium model. Since we have only one consumer, the Pareto-optimal solution will simply be the one that 
maximizes the utility function. The expenditure level is thus determined by the value of this consumption 
calculated at equilibrium prices. 
k It is well known in consumer demand theory that the form of utility function that yields LES is g(C+), as 
above, or its logarithmic equivalent [20]. 
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This formulation may be interpreted in terms of consumer demand theory as a case 
where there is no substitutability between different commodities. 
We have therefore stablished the formal similarity of the programming model and 
the equilibrium model. There is, in fact, only one point on which the two models are not 
formally identical. This is the "mechanism" by which the allocation of primary resources 
is controlled exogenously. It is even tempting to interpret these different formulations as 
alternative ways of reflecting the limited intersectoral mobility of primary factors. In an 
otherwise perfect market economy, this limited mobility would be expressed indirectly, 
by varying rates of return on the primary factors. In a centrally planned economy, on the 
other hand, this limited mobility would be accounted for directly, in terms of physical 
constraints. The planners would separate the sectorally committed (immobile) fraction of 
the primary factors from the mobile fraction at the outset. We should also stress that the 
similarity is formal, in that the actual meaning of the parameters, variables, and equations 
of the two models may be completely different, as noted earlier. 
We would like to complete our comparison by pointing to the possibility of using 
alternative conomic policy goals to measure efficiency gains in general equilibrium 
resource allocation models just as alternative objective functions are used in program- 
ming models. It should be clear from the equilibrium conditions that the model presented 
is not a completely closed equilibrium system: the distribution and redistribution of 
income, and their effects on final demand, are not considered in the model. At the same 
time, total expenditure and consumption are determined endogenously. The program- 
ming reformulation sheds some light on the way in which total expenditure may be 
determined. Since all other possible policy targets, such as net investments, government 
consumption, levels of primary input use, and the balance of current accounts are exo- 
genous variables, practically all gains (resulting from increased allocational efficiency) 
will appear as increases in the consumers' utility. In the light of this consideration, it 
becomes obvious that the general equilibrium model too can be made to reflect different 
economic policy goals, e.g., increasing government consumption or net invest- 
ment, decreasing the deficit on current account, or a combination of these. The 
incorporation of "objective functions" other than consumption would in most cases 
need changes only in the structure of endogenous and exogenous variables, or perhaps 
involve the introduction of some new variables and equations. Simple modifications of 
this type can make the equilibrium model capable of handling alternative policy objec- 
tives in the same way as programming models. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that a certain class of multisectoral general equilibrium models, by 
proper reinterpretation f elements, can be adopted to support planning in socialist 
countries. We have also demonstrated how certain onlinear formulations of substitution 
possibilities could be utilized in macroprogramming models in order to keep the model 
relatively small and generate more meaningful dual solutions. 
One major advantage of the equilibrium framework is that it makes the dual side of 
the model less distorted while explicitly taking into account he interaction of real and 
value variables. Thus, it may help planning modellers to achieve a better linkage between 
plans for real and value processes. These two main planning functions are usually quite 
separate from each other in both traditional planning and modelling. Changes in relative 
prices, costs, tariffs, etc., are not properly reflected in physical allocation models, while the 
effects of production, import/export, and consumption decisions are not always taken into 
consideration i  price planning models. 
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The mixed, primal-dual formulation of the resource allocation problem also makes it 
possible to reinterpret he notion of efficiency (shadow) prices. On the one hand, it 
allows the model builder to explicitly introduce shadow-price-dependent resource al- 
location decisions into his model. In our simple model, it was quite easy to see how the 
efficiency=price=dependent co sumption decisions related to the programming program 
formulation. In more complex cases, it seems to be more useful and straightforward to 
use such price-dependent (mixed primal-dual) decision rules explicitly (for a more 
detailed discussion of this issue, especially the treatment of export and import decisions, 
see Ref. I). 
On the other hand, the equilibrium formulation makes it pessible to incorporate 
price-formation rules that reflect the actual process more accurately than the shadow 
prices of (linear) programming models. For example, even with constant returns to scale, 
it is possible to define prices that do contain profits (markup). One can also take into 
account changes in taxes and tariffs and see how these would affect the allocation 
decisions. 
These comments uggest hat the possible use of general equilibrium models is not 
limited to coordinating a plan. In fact, we believe that these models could also be used 
for either ex post or ex ante simulation of various issues of concern to planners. Using 
statistical estimates of the model parameters,  tructurally similar models (especially their 
multiperiod extensions) could be tested in the forecasting phase of planning. ~A general 
equilibrium f ramework could also form a useful basis for analyzing certain kinds of 
disequilibria. Thus, in short, the study and adaption of general equilibrium modelling 
techniques may enrich the existing planning modelling methodology of the centrally 
planned economies in a number of different ways. 
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